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The origin of [modern] technology lies at a
point where, by an unconscious ruse, human
beings first began to distance themselves from
nature. It lies, in other words, in play.
Walter Benjamin, ‘‘The Work of Art in the
Age of its Technological Reproducibility,’’
Second version (1936), Selected Writings,
vol. 3, 107

i the always-new as the ever-same
here is an unacknowledged paradox in many
recent descriptions of modern technology.
The impact of imminent technological developments is often described as ‘‘unprecedented,’’ as
presaging fundamental changes that will inundate, overwhelm or saturate inherited parameters
of perception and understanding to such an
extent that existing patterns of social interaction
and political organization will be swept away. Yet
the explication of technology’s ‘‘unprecedented’’
effect imagines it primarily in terms that
reproduce existing features of social experience,
albeit in more intensified or extensive ways.1
Such claims to articulate the unprecedented
nature of modern technology fail to identify
how reproduction might introduce anything that
is qualitatively new; they fail to account for that
element of newness within repetition that initiates
or inaugurates, or what Hannah Arendt had
described as that ‘‘element of the ‘miraculous’
present in all reality [which ensures] that events,
no matter how well anticipated in hope or fear,
strike us with shock and surprise once they come
to pass.’’2
Arendt’s concern for ‘‘newness’’ is associated
in her work with the concept of ‘‘natality,’’ and
underlies her understanding of politics as creative, as an intersubjective realm constituted by
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the openness and unpredictability of what she
calls ‘‘action.’’ As such, it might potentially
provide an important resource for thinking the
political implications of modern technology: for
just as contemporary assessments of technology
are characterized by a failure to think the impact
of technology beyond notions of reproduction
and intensification, so they tend to envisage the
political consequences of technology in terms of
static repetition, generating dystopian scenarios
of disempowerment and loss of agency.3 In
contrast, Arendt’s emphasis on the moment of
newness in political action – and for Arendt it
is speech that is the most significant form of
political action – suggests the possibility of
rethinking the interplay of politics and technics
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creativity and technics
not simply in terms of reproduction but also
through the matrix of creativity.
However, if Arendt’s concept of natality
suggests a different relationship between politics,
technics and creativity, this is not to say that
Arendt’s writing necessarily pursues this avenue.
Indeed, in her often insightful but highly
problematic work The Human Condition
(1958), Arendt rejects this possibility from the
outset. Responding to calls for a reinvention of
the political through an ‘‘adjust[ment of] our
cultural attitudes to the present status of
scientific achievement,’’ she insists that ‘‘if we
follow th[is] advice . . . we would in all earnest
adopt a way of life in which speech is no longer
meaningful.’’4 For Arendt, the impulse to
rejuvenate the political by way of its negotiation
with technology would bring not the reinvention
of politics but its liquidation.
Given this rejection, it is striking that a
different relationship between politics, technics
and creativity was anticipated by a thinker whose
most celebrated work on technology pre-dates
The Human Condition by some two decades,
namely Walter Benjamin. Arendt not only knew
of Benjamin’s work – her 1968 essay on Benjamin
played an important role in introducing Benjamin
to the English-speaking world – but they struck
up a warm, if brief, friendship as fellow refugees
in Paris in the late 1930s.5 But like much of the
anglophone reception of Benjamin in which
she played a part, Arendt fails to register the
radicality of Benjamin’s thinking of technics and
creativity. This failure is in turn instructive for
thinking the categorical framework of The
Human Condition, both in terms of its abstract
opposition of ‘‘action,’’ ‘‘work’’ and ‘‘labor,’’ and
in its underestimation of the modern philosophical engagement with technology initiated by
Hegel.6
Since the 1960s the anglophone reception of
Benjamin has been marked by a reliance on a
very limited number of translated works,
whereby individual essays have achieved a
prominence that isolates them from the complex
web of Benjamin’s intellectual engagements.
In turn, this isolation has made such texts –
and in particular Benjamin’s most famous essay,
Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen

Reproduzierbarkeit (1935–36) – particularly vulnerable to being assimilated to the various
intellectual movements and concerns that have
traversed the Anglo-American academy over this
period. The publication in recent years of a
relatively wide selection of Benjamin’s authorship
in translation provides the resources for challenging this assimilation, which is, after all,
a reduction of the productivity and potentiality
of Benjamin’s text. The aim of this study is not
to propose an ‘‘authentic’’ reading of Benjamin’s
essay, that is, not to restore its meaning ‘‘as it
once really was’’; rather, it is to follow Benjamin’s
demand in ‘‘The Task of the Translator’’ (1922)
for a literal rendering of the text, which
punctures the placid appearance of the present
by returning into it the unfamiliar conjunctions
and relationships that lie embedded in the
original.7

ii newness and the fate of the world
The central concern of The Human Condition is
to provide the basis for an enriched account of
the political, which Arendt saw as a priority in the
wake of her analysis of the modern propensity
to violence in The Origins of Totalitarianism
(1951). Consequently, discussion of technology is
embedded within the larger architectonic of the
work, which pursues an examination of what
Arendt calls the ‘‘vita activa.’’ While this term
suggests that the pivotal conceptual opposition
will be with the ‘‘vita contemplativa’’ that
occupies her posthumously published The Life
of the Mind (1978), in fact the conceptual terrain
of the study is organized primarily around a
threefold distinction within the vita activa,
between ‘‘labor,’’ ‘‘work’’ and ‘‘action.’’
This strong conception of the political rests on
the notion of action developed in the fourth part
of The Human Condition: ‘‘The polis, properly
speaking,’’ Arendt writes there, ‘‘is not the citystate in its physical location; it is the organization
of the people as it arises out of acting and
speaking together’’ (HC 198). What she wants us
to understand by action centers not on human
activity per se but on the element of creation,
initiation and newness that can arise only there;
and crucially, she sees this element of creativity
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as intrinsic to the human condition because of the
biological fact of birth:
To act, in its most general sense, means to take
an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word
archein, ‘‘to begin,’’ ‘‘to lead,’’ and eventually
‘‘to rule,’’ indicates), to set something in
motion. Because they are initium, newcomers
and beginners by virtue of birth, men take
initiative
and
are
prompted
into
action. . . . With the creation of man, the
principle of beginning came into the world,
which, of course, is only another way of saying
that the principle of freedom was created when
man was created but not before. (HC 177)

In coining her neologism ‘‘natality,’’ Arendt
seeks to capture the fundamentally human
character of this capacity for creation, which is
both the basis for politics and the reason why the
end of politics is freedom: ‘‘action as beginning
corresponds to the fact of birth, . . . it is the
actualization of the human condition of natality’’
(HC 178). And because ‘‘with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world,’’ then
each person ‘‘is unique,’’ which for Arendt points
to ‘‘the essential human condition of plurality,
the acting and speaking together, which is the
condition of all forms of political organization’’
(HC 178, 202).
The unprecedented, creative and plural character of action underpins Arendt’s valorization of
politics, since political action is now understood
as both ‘‘boundless’’ and ‘‘unpredictable.’’ Even
‘‘the smallest act in the most limited circumstances,’’ Arendt insists, ‘‘bears the seed of the
same boundlessness, because one deed, and
sometimes one word, suffices to change every
constellation’’ (HC 190). As such, the ‘‘full
meaning’’ of a political act cannot be predicted
or foretold, but ‘‘can reveal itself only when it has
ended’’ (HC 192). However, this means that
political action is by its very nature fleeting and
fragile, and Arendt pointedly talks of ‘‘the frailty
of human affairs’’ (HC 188). Indeed, the
genuinely ‘‘new form of government’’ that
Arendt recommends for the modern world – as
opposed to the Greek polis which remains a
central theoretical model despite its antiquity – is
‘‘the system of people’s councils’’ which arose as
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a fleeting but ‘‘never successfu[l]’’ possibility of
the workers’ movement (HC 216). The very terms
which make political action so valuable for
Arendt are those which make it so vulnerable,
a vulnerability that emerges once placed in
relation to her two other classifications of
human activity – ‘‘work’’ and ‘‘labor’’; and it is
the specifically modern reformulation of the
relationship of action, work and labor in
technology that underlies the political pessimism
of The Human Condition, notwithstanding its
attempt to stake out and defend a strong concept
of the political.8
Although Arendt’s discussion of the ‘‘frailty’’
of the political realm suggests that its vulnerability lies in the very boundlessness of political
action, the cumulative argument of The Human
Condition locates the most significant threat not
in the inherently excessive character of ‘‘the
human condition’’ but in nature, or what is
termed ‘‘earth.’’9 Notwithstanding the opening
claim of The Human Condition that ‘‘earth is the
very quintessence of the human condition,’’ its
argument is organized around an existential
opposition of the human to nature. It is the
task of what Arendt calls ‘‘the human artifice of
the world’’ to ‘‘separat[e] human existence from
all mere animal environment’’ (HC 2); indeed,
without such ‘‘a world,’’ Arendt insists, ‘‘there
would be nothing but changeless eternal recurrence, the deathless everlastingness of the human
as of all other animal species’’ (HC 97). The
ramifications of this opposition are multiplied
because Arendt’s nature inhabits the human
itself: nature includes the ‘‘life process’’ – or
physiological metabolism – and the emotional
disposition of the human organism, as well as the
inanimate and animate world which would sustain
this organism. The human is therefore riven by a
deep opposition between what Arendt calls
‘‘animal laborans’’ – that dimension of being
centered on the reproduction of biological or
‘‘natural’’ life – and ‘‘zoon politikon’’ – the
properly human condition initiated by acting and
speaking together (HC 22–23).
The conflict between nature and the human
configures Arendt’s distinction between ‘‘action’’
and ‘‘labor,’’ opposing the former as a creation
ex nihilo to the latter’s sterile reproduction.

creativity and technics
Underlying this opposition are two different
temporalities: action initiates and creates, introducing ‘‘newness’’ into the ‘‘changeless eternal
recurrence’’ of nature from the outside, as it were
(HC 97); labor, on the other hand, is fundamentally tied to satisfying the biological needs of the
‘‘animal laborans,’’ and so the temporality of
labor replicates ‘‘the rhythmic repetition of the
life process and its metabolism with nature,’’
reproducing the same again and again (HC 146).
Thus, the repetitive rhythm of labor menaces the
very creativity that defines the human, since it
insinuates within human activity the eternal
return of nature or ‘‘earth,’’ so threatening the
absorption of the human within ‘‘the deathless
everlastingness . . . of all other animal species’’
(HC 97). Because it reproduces within human
activity the cyclical reproduction of nature,
according
to
Arendt
‘‘animal
laborans . . . remains the servant of nature and the
earth’’ (HC 139).
Like labor, but in marked contrast to action,
‘‘work’’ is based not on creation but on
reproduction; however, crucially for The
Human Condition, work is understood to
manifest a different kind of reproduction, one
that reproduces not nature but a preexisting idea.
Because labor’s ‘‘repetition is urged upon [it] and
remains subject to the biological cycle,’’ it
involves the reproduction of ‘‘the needs and
wants of the human body’’ which, even ‘‘though
they reappear again and again at regular intervals,’’ ‘‘come and go’’ and ‘‘never remain for any
length of time.’’ This ephemeral reproduction of
the ephemeral is dismissed as ‘‘mere repetition’’
by Arendt, in favor of the ‘‘multiplication’’ she
locates in work. ‘‘Multiplication, in distinction
from mere repetition,’’ she writes, ‘‘multiplies
something that already possesses a relatively
stable, relatively permanent existence in the
world’’ (HC 142); that is, work converts
the permanent impermanency of earth into the
relative permanence of what Arendt calls
‘‘world,’’ by refashioning nature within the
coordinates of a properly human design.
‘‘World,’’ according to Arendt, is the ‘‘human
artifice’’ that ‘‘separates human existence from all
mere animal environment’’ (HC 2); it is the
barrier between the human and ‘‘the deathless

everlastingness . . . of all other animal species’’
(HC 97). From the standpoint of human beings,
Arendt argues, ‘‘the most important task of
human artifice is to offer a dwelling place more
permanent and more stable than themselves,’’
understood as biological beings or animal
laborans (HC 152). For ‘‘[w]ithout a world
between men and nature,’’ she insists, ‘‘there is
eternal movement, but no objectivity,’’ and so
human action cannot be revealed, recognized or
remembered.10 The fleeting nature of praxis,
then, requires a poiesis to build a world that will
outlast it: zoon politikon requires homo faber to
erect the public space within which action can
appear.
It is at this stage that The Human Condition
considers modern technology, placing its discussion at the heart of the book’s attempt to think
politics in modernity; but as such it inherits the
contradictions and elisions bound up in Arendt’s
opposition of a human creativity to the reproduction of nature. The importance that Arendt
assigns to the fabrication of a ‘‘world’’ in her
attempt to develop a strong concept of the
political might suggest that her approach implies
the need for a negotiation between praxis and
poiesis, or politics and technics. However, The
Human Condition rules out the possibility of
such a negotiation by characterizing modern
technology as ineluctably bound to the degraded
reproduction of labor. Yet in describing the fate
of modernity, The Human Condition offers a
profoundly contradictory account of modern
technology, which despite itself must accord to
technology an element of creation (HC 148). In
describing technology as both reproductive and
creative, Arendt’s text suggests the possibility of
a different configuration of the relationship
between praxis and poiesis, or between politics
and technics.
The central charge against modern technology
in The Human Condition is that it converts
the cumulative reproduction characteristic of
work – which grants a relative permanence to
objects – into the ephemeral reproduction of
labor, where the product is simply consumed;
thus, in the shift from tools to automatic
machines there is a shift from a linear temporality
that enables the accretion of a world, to the
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cyclical and empty eternal return of biological
consumption. What underpins the secret affinity
between modern technology and nature is a
shared temporal organization based on rhythmic
repetition: ‘‘nothing can be mechanized more
easily and less artificially than the rhythm of the
labor process,’’ writes Arendt, ‘‘which in turn
corresponds to the equally automatic repetitive
rhythm of the life process and its metabolism
with nature’’ (HC 146). Modern technology
marks the predominance not of homo faber but
of animal laborans, who ‘‘does not use tools and
instruments in order to build a world but in order
to ease the labors of its own life processes’’;
in bringing about ‘‘the emancipation of labor,’’
then, technology ‘‘supplant[s] human labor
power with the superior power of natural
forces’’ (HC 147).
At the same time, however, The Human
Condition also suggests a more complex account
of technology that exceeds the terms of reproduction. In the initial stages of industrialization,
technology is ‘‘still characterized by an imitation
of natural processes’’ (HC 148); but in the shift to
electrically powered automation, a qualitative
change is identified:
This stage can no longer be described in terms
of a gigantic enlargement and continuation of
the old arts and crafts. . . . For here we no
longer use material as nature yields it to us,
killing natural processes or interrupting or
imitating them. In all these instances, we
changed and denaturalized for our own
worldly ends, so that the human world or
artifice on the one hand and nature on the
other remained two distinctly separated entities. Today we have begun to ‘‘create,’’ as it
were, that is to unchain natural processes of
our own which would never have happened
without us, and instead of carefully surrounding the human artifice with defenses against
nature’s elementary forces, keeping them as
far as possible outside the man-made world,
we have channeled these forces, along with
their elementary power, into the world itself.
(HC 148–49; emphasis added)

Ostensibly, what is threatening about modern
technology is that it ‘‘channels’’ the ‘‘elementary
power’’ of nature into the human world,
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degrading the cumulative reproduction of work
to the ephemeral reproduction of labor; but as
Arendt must in part concede, what is perhaps
more frightening is that the operation of
technology exceeds reproduction. Despite the
typographical cordon sanitaire of quotation
marks, Arendt nominates the power of technology as creation, because rather than simply
reproducing nature, technology ‘‘unchain[s]
natural processes . . . which would never have
happened without [it]’’ (HC 148).
In addition to typography, The Human
Condition deploys a conceptual cordon sanitaire in its insistence that the intrusion of
nature remains within reproduction since nature
is fixed: consequently, it argues, the infusion of
its elementary powers can only be the eternal
return of the same. Yet Arendt warns that ‘‘if
present technology consists of channeling
natural forces into the world of human artifice,
future technology may yet consist of channeling
the universal forces of the cosmos around us
into the nature of the earth,’’ so transforming
‘‘the household of nature as we have known it
since the beginning of our world’’ (HC 150).
But the future may already be here, for in
criticizing the design of consumer goods Arendt
concedes that their ‘‘shape’’ is based neither on
‘‘human standards of utility of beauty’’ nor
merely on the ‘‘basic functions’’ of the life
process, but ‘‘depend[s] entirely upon the
capacity of the machine’’ (HC 152). That is,
she concedes that their structuring is open for
invention beyond the static reproduction of
world or earth, since in the machine the very
coordinates of space and time may themselves
be reinvented.

iii technik beyond the work of art
If The Human Condition finds the durability of
human artifice to be threatened in the work of the
world, it locates a more comforting permanence
in the work of art. Because it is ‘‘removed
from the exigencies and wants of daily life,’’ art
is described as having ‘‘survived gloriously
its severance from religion, magic and myth’’
(HC 167).11 Arendt interprets this ‘‘survival’’
as ‘‘a durability [that] is almost untouched by
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the corroding effects of natural processes,’’
a ‘‘durability’’ that
is of a higher order than that which all things
need in order to exist at all; it can attain
a permanence throughout the ages. In
this permanence, the very stability of
the human artifice, which, being inhabited
and used by mortals, can never be
absolute, achieves a representation of its
own. Nowhere else does the sheer durability
of the world of things appear in such
purity and clarity, nowhere else does
this thing-world reveal itself so spectacularly
as the non-mortal home for mortal beings.
(HC 167–68)

‘‘It is as though worldly stability had become
transparent in the work of art,’’ Arendt writes
(HC 168; emphasis added). But, of course, this
statement remains an ‘‘as if’’: for as the text
repeatedly confirms, ‘‘worldly stability’’ is available ‘‘nowhere else.’’
The extraordinary significance ascribed to art
in The Human Condition – a work concerned
primarily with developing a richer account of the
political, and not with aesthetics – is thus a
function of the pessimism that haunts its vision of
the fate of the world in technology. Conversely,
the critique of the work of art developed by
Walter Benjamin in ‘‘The Work of Art in the
Age of its Technological Reproducibility’’ is best
understood as an engagement with what we might
describe in Arendtian terms as the fate of the
world as a context for political action – rather
than primarily a work of aesthetics in the postRomantic sense. Indeed, as Benjamin makes
clear, its account of the historically changing
experience of art ‘‘is symptomatic,’’ and ‘‘its
significance extends far beyond the realm of
art.’’12 However, in English-speaking cultural
criticism the essay’s exploration of the radical
consequences of modern technology has been
obscured by a preoccupation with a concept of
‘‘aura’’ removed from the broader conceptual
context of Benjamin’s thinking.13 This tendency
has been encouraged by the availability, until
recently, of only the last version of the essay
in English, and by the translation’s prominent
use of the phrase ‘‘mechanical reproduction,’’

a rendering that suggests a static or identical
duplication.
Underlying the essay’s account of the ‘‘decay
of aura’’ is a broader reconceptualization of
experience that seeks to avoid the opposition
between technology and a properly human
artifice or technique, a paradigm which, as we
have seen, structures The Human Condition. As
Julian Roberts has pointed out, Benjamin does
this by exploiting the ambiguity of the German
word Technik, whose meaning includes two
distinct senses that in English are expressed by
the terms ‘‘technique’’ and ‘‘technology,’’ respectively. Thus, as Roberts observes, ‘‘a piece of
machinery is Technik, and so are the methods
and organisations used to exploit it.’’14 According
to Howard Caygill, this extended usage is
designed to overcome the traditional opposition
between the ‘‘spiritual’’ and the ‘‘material’’ by
conceiving of Technik ‘‘as a medium of organization which pattern[s] experience while being
reciprocally subject to change in the face of
experience.’’15 As a way of describing the
organization of experience, Technik not only
designates an apparatus like the camera or ‘‘visual
technics’’ such as drawing or painting, but also
pre-modern ways of relating to nature such as
ritual or magic.
Benjamin’s new concept of Technik therefore
marks a considerable extension of what we
normally think of as ‘‘technology,’’ a point that
is made clear in the first and second versions of
the Work of Art essay, but which is elided in the
third version. Thus, in the second version of the
essay Benjamin describes both film and magic
as forms of Technik, in that they each constitute
a particular way of organizing the relationship
between humanity and the phenomenal world, or
what the essay terms ‘‘nature.’’ However, if
both are designated as instances of ‘‘technology,’’
the essay insists on a radical difference between
them, a difference reflected terminologically
in the distinction between what is called the
‘‘first technology’’ of myth and magic, and the
‘‘second technology’’ of modernity. This distinction is elaborated in terms of two different
temporalities that emerge from the historically
variable relation between humanity and the
phenomenal world.
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According to Benjamin, magic emerged as a
response to ‘‘the requirements of a society whose
technology existed only in fusion with ritual’’ –
that is, a technology that was tied to the repetition
of natural forms in order to master and control
them. Consequently, ‘‘the results of [this] first
technology [appear as] valid once and for all’’
since ‘‘it deals with irreparable lapse or sacrificial
death, which holds good for eternity’’; that is,
first technology remains tied to the configuration
of space and time given by a nature whose cycles
appear fixed and eternal. In contrast, the second
technology of modernity emerges ‘‘when human
beings first began to distance themselves from
nature,’’ a distance understood as freedom from
the reproduction of natural forms, or from the
givenness of spatio-temporal configuration; ‘‘It
lies, in other words,’’ Benjamin writes, ‘‘in play’’
(SW 107). Thus, the historical development of
technology involves a fundamental reformulation
of the transcendental structure of experience,
which marks a shift from the static spatiotemporal framework of myth to a new condition
characterized by the mutability of space and time.
As such, the central feature of this second
technology is not reproduction, or repetition
with a fixed spatio-temporal framework, but
reproducibility, or the reinvention of the coordinates of space and time in each moment of
‘‘repetition.’’16 In ‘‘play’’ repetition is at the same
time reinvention, as exemplified by film, where
images are not simply reproduced according to
preexisting spatio-temporal coordinates, but
‘‘are assembled according to a new law’’
(SW 116; emphasis added).
We miss the historical specificity of modern
technology, therefore, if we privilege technological reproduction at the expense of the new
element of ‘‘play’’ contained within it. However,
the essay is routinely read as being concerned
primarily with a shift from handcraft to
‘‘mechanical reproduction,’’ and therefore as
implying an ‘‘age’’ of electronic reproduction to
come; each ‘‘age’’ is then in turn associated with a
particular set of technologies that would correspond to it: sculpture and painting; photography
and film; digital video or computer-generated
imagery. But in fact the decisive shift from first
to second technology begins to emerge prior to
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photography and film in lithography, which is
seen to mark ‘‘an essentially new stage’’ since it
not only allows the production of ‘‘large numbers
[of copies] as previously’’ but also produces them
‘‘in daily changing variations’’ (SW 102;
emphasis added). In the essay’s discussion of
photography and film this transformation is
explored both in terms of the arrangement of
the phenomenal world and in terms of the
coordinates of perception. The photograph ‘‘can
put the copy . . . in situations which the original
itself cannot attain,’’ while through the processes
of enlargement and slow motion, the camera can
‘‘record images which escape natural optics
altogether,’’ so reformulating the very spatiotemporal parameters of human perception
(SW 103).
What are also occluded when the essay is read
through the frame of ‘‘reproduction’’ are the
different political possibilities that are opened up
by the new spatio-temporal condition signaled by
‘‘reproducibility.’’ Benjamin argues that ‘‘the
first technology really sought to master nature’’
because it lacked its inventive or productive
power, and so in a sense always remained
subordinate to it (SW 107). For Benjamin, the
unprecedented reformulation of space and time
that Marx had identified in the Grundrisse and
Capital had not been met with corresponding
changes in the modes of organization of social
experience – or the social, political and legal
‘‘technics’’ of the modern nation-state. Thus,
while the phenomenal world was being reorganized according to new rhythms of acceleration
and configurations of spatial porosity, the
political and social structures of right, possession,
belonging and exclusion remained rigidly bound
to an organization of space and time modeled on
the self-identity of an integral and enduring
Being. As a consequence, they can be maintained
only through an increasingly violent subordination of the mutability and porosity of social
experience, a subordination manifested at the
level of perception as ‘‘aura.’’
Yet the unprecedented productive potential of
the second technology means that such an
imperative to domination is no longer necessary,
in the sense that it has become practically
possible to envisage a reciprocal ‘‘interplay

creativity and technics
between nature and humanity.’’ Instead of
positing the absolute incommensurability of
technology and a ‘‘properly human’’ action,
Benjamin looked to technology itself as the
‘‘schema’’ or matrix that would reinvent the
very terms of this relation. The central significance of film in the Work of Art essay lies in its
capacity to figure a different kind of response to
the mutability of space and time in technology –
albeit at the level of perception. Instead of
appealing to tradition or to a notion of the
‘‘properly human’’ to organize interpretation in
the face of technological modernity, the technology of film generates a perceptual matrix that can
respond to the porosity and transitivity of the
phenomenal world without fixing it within a static
transcendental framework. Thus, rather than
opposing the transitivity of second technology
with the fixed coordinates inherited from the first
technology, the spatio-temporal openness of film
offers a response that is reciprocal. Film therefore
points to different political, social, and legal
technics that would, in the words of another
essay, move ‘‘to correct the incapacity of peoples
to order their relationships to one another in
accord with the relationship they possess to
nature through their technology.’’17
But if this possibility is made practicable in
modern technology, that is not to say that it will
be realized. On the contrary, as Benjamin notes,
in fact we persist in ‘‘viewing the second
technology in terms of the first’’ – that is, we
persist in ‘‘describ[ing] the goal of the second
technology as ‘mastery over nature’’’ (SW 107).
As such, Benjamin’s Technik marks a violently
unstable disjunction that runs through the
political and social fabric of modernity.

iv the politics of creativity
In the wake of her analysis of modernity’s
propensity to violence in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, Arendt’s claim in The Human
Condition that the ‘‘polis, properly speaking, is
not the city-state in its physical location’’ but
‘‘the organization of people as it arises out of
speaking and acting together’’ was designed to
underpin a strong account of the political by
separating it from what she calls ‘‘the social.’’18

However, in the earlier text the fate of modern
politics was located within the global reorganization of the space and time of social experience;
in The Human Condition, on the other hand,
a formal concept of the political is opposed to
the mutability of space and time through the
opposition of ‘‘action’’ to a technology that can
only be the reduction of ‘‘work’’ to ‘‘labor.’’19
In this context, the fate of the world is sealed by
the ineluctably cyclical character of technology’s
reproduction. Such an abstraction of politics
from social experience may have unintended
consequences: for if political action – which
Arendt identifies with the spontaneous workers’
councils of modern popular protest and specifically the workers’ movement – is cast as
inevitably unsuccessful, then such a concept of
the political becomes an unattainable ‘‘ought,’’
leaving the flawed ‘‘republic’’ as the best worst
option available.20 Thus, notwithstanding
Arendt’s powerful invocation of the creativity
of politics, we may be left with the eternal return
of the same.
Benjamin’s concept of Technik offers a
significant alternative in this respect, since its
account of reproducibility requires us to think
technology beyond reproduction. If Arendt’s
notion of the political threatens to ossify in the
formalism of ‘‘the republic,’’ Benjamin’s concept
of Technik – which marks the violent disparity
between the technological reorganization of the
phenomenal world and our inherited configurations of value and meaning – requires that we
think the creativity of the political in relation
both to the reproduction and the reinvention of
social experience in global technology.
Yet if this is true, there remains a significant
lacuna in Benjamin’s difficult leap from the
perceptual experience of film to the reinvention
of politics, a lacuna that harks back to Benjamin’s
problematic account of the political in ‘‘Critique
of Violence’’ (1921).21 For if film makes possible
an image-world open to assembly under ‘‘a new
law’’ in the spontaneity of collective reception,
this reception nonetheless takes place within
accumulated networks of inequality and power
which press upon and shape the spontaneity of
legislation (SW 116). In that case, this spontaneous legislation will be determined by a
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disposition that cannot be distinguished, known
or evaluated, other than through abstract polarities such as ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new,’’ ‘‘permanent’’ and
‘‘transitory,’’ or indeed ‘‘fascism’’ and ‘‘communism’’ (SW 122). Benjamin’s rethinking of
technology, therefore, still requires a developed
concept of the political through which the politics
of creativity can be negotiated. For unless the
creativity of the polis is accompanied by a means
of orientation that can register the shifting global
topography of inequality and
injustice, the spontaneity of its
legislation may unwittingly
reproduce this inequality and
injustice again and again.

notes
An earlier version of parts of section iii appeared
in ‘‘Glass Before its Time, Premature Iron:
The Unforeseeable Futures of Technology in
Benjamin’s Arcades Project,’’ New Formations 54
(winter 2004 ^ 05).
1 For an analysis of recent approaches in
cultural theory that function in these terms see
Graham MacPhee, The Architecture of the Visible,
chapter 2.
2 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future 170.
3 See MacPhee, Architecture of the Visible,
chapter 2, esp. 72^76,100 ^ 03.
4 Arendt, The Human Condition 3^ 4; hereafter
cited as HC.
5 Arendt, ‘‘Walter Benjamin: 1892^1940.’’ A sense
of the warmth of their friendship, and of
Benjamin’s appreciation of Arendt’s intellect, can
be gleaned from Benjamin’s letters; see Benjamin,
The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 1910^1940
596, 601. Arendt was, of course, the editor of
the first selection of Benjamin’s essays in
English, Illuminations, published in 1968. This
highly influential collection follows the 1955
Suhrkamp selection of Benjamin’s writing edited
by Adorno, which includes only the third version
of the Work of Art essay.
6 See esp.G.W.F. Hegel, Hegeland The Human Spirit.
For an account of Hegel’s engagement with politics
and technology, see Fine, Political Investigations.
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7 Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol.1, 253^ 63.
8 ‘‘Pessimism’’ is used here in a technical rather
than capricious sense: it is not that Arendt foresees a future decline within an open interpretative
paradigm, but rather that the interpretative categories she puts in place seal the future as a ‘‘fate’’
that is non-negotiable.
9 Cf. The Origins of Totalitarianism 301^ 02: in the
retrospective light of The Human Condition, the
threat of an exponentially increasing population
of superfluous people risks appearing automatic ^
literally built in to modern technology.
10 HC 137; for Arendt’s account of the political as
revelatory see HC178 ^ 88.
11 For Benjamin, in contrast, the decay of tradition does not straightforwardly erase the origin
of art in ritual, but gives it a new and unexpected
significance: see Selected Writings, vol. 3, 105^ 06;
cited hereafter as SW.
12 Benjamin, SW104.
13 For a fuller consideration of ‘‘aura’’ see Graham
MacPhee, ‘‘Technology, Time and the Return of
Abstract Painting.’’
14 Julian Roberts,Walter Benjamin 157.
15 Howard Caygill,Walter Benjamin 96. The argument presented here draws on Caygill’s rereading
of Benjamin’s thinking in terms of a ‘‘transcendental but speculative philosophy’’ (4).
16 Just as the significance of creativity for
Benjamin’s thinking of technology has tended to
be ignored in anglophone cultural theory, so conversely has the importance of technology for his
thinking of creativity. Thus, in his ‘‘Infinite Spaces’’
Marc Cauchi fails to consider the complexity of
Benjamin’s account of technology, seeing only the
reductive opposition of ‘‘the bourgeois logic of
eternal recurrence’’ and a ‘‘creation ex nihilo’’ (24).
17 Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 2, 320.
18 HC 198; for Arendt’s account of the social see
HC 22^73.
19 Notwithstanding Arendt’s later insistence on
the purity of politics, part 2 of The Origins of
Totalitarianism, ‘‘Imperialism,’’ locates the reformulation of modern politics within the spatial and
temporal organization of the globe: see esp.
123^57.

creativity and technics
20 Kant’s formulation of morality as an ‘‘ought’’ is
the subject of Hegel’s sustained critique: for a
statement of this critique see Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Spirit, sect. 618, 374 ^75. Arendt’s
‘‘Reflections on Little Rock’’ (1959) and On
Revolution (1963) both indicate that in the significant instance of the USA, her account of the
‘‘republic’’ proves unable to sustain the analysis of
the involvement of the ‘‘internal’’ space of politics
in the reformulation of the globe begun in The
Origins of Totalitarianism.
21 ‘‘Critique of Violence’’ in Benjamin, Selected
Writings, vol. 1, 236^52. For a critique of
Benjamin’s essay see Caygill,Walter Benjamin 27^29.
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